

Anselm on Freedom: A Defense of Rogers's Project, A Critique of her Reconciliation of Libertarian Freedom with God the Creator Omnium

W. Matthews Grant
University of St. Thomas, St. Paul

After emphasizing the importance of Rogers's book and defending its methodology, I critique Rogers's strategy for reconciling libertarian creaturely freedom with the doctrine that God is the cause of all being apart from Himself. I maintain that Rogers's denial that creaturely choices are caused by God is problematic as an interpretation of Anselm; furthermore, this denial means she must also deny either that creaturely choices have being, or that God is the cause of all being apart from Himself. The former denial is untenable; the latter constitutes rejecting God as creator omnium, not reconciling that doctrine with libertarian creaturely freedom.

Introduction to and Defense of the Project

Within the world of contemporary philosophy of religion, the theist who holds a libertarian account of human freedom is commonly thought to have two options: She can be a Molinist or she can be an Open Theist. The Molinist promises to reconcile libertarian freedom with divine foreknowledge and God's providential control over history. To be a Molinist, however, one has to hold that there are truths of an arguably fantastic sort, truths about what merely possible creatures would freely do in merely possible circumstances in which they might find themselves.¹ Open Theists promise to combine theism and libertarian freedom without commitment to such peculiar truths. Yet, being an Open Theist means settling for a relatively weak conception of divine sovereignty, subjecting God to a life marked by time and change, and denying that God has knowledge of free creaturely acts that take place in the future.²

The publication of Katherin Rogers's *Anselm on Freedom* is a significant event³ not only because it constitutes the first book-length treatment of Anselm's views on freedom in over twenty-five years, but also because it presents a third, comprehensive option for the libertarian theist. Rogers maintains that Anselm is the first Christian philosopher—and maybe the first philosopher—to offer a systematic libertarian analysis of freedom (1). What's more, she argues that Anselm shows how libertarian freedom can be reconciled with a number of theological doctrines that philosophers and theologians, whether libertarian or not, have often found to be in tension with the creaturely freedom espoused by the same theological tradition. Thus, Rogers argues that Anselm shows how the Christian can be a libertarian without falling into Pelagianism, insisting that the justice lost at the Fall can be restored only by God's unmerited gift, yet that once it has been restored, it is up to the creature whether to hold on to or abandon this justice. Likewise does Rogers's Anselm reconcile libertarian freedom with God the *Creator*

¹ For an exposition and defense of Molinism, see Thomas P. Flint, *Divine Providence: The Molinist Account* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998).

² For an exposition and defense of Open Theism, see Clark Pinnock et al., *The Openness of God* (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1994).

³ Katherin Rogers, *Anselm on Freedom* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) (hereafter cited in text as *AOF*).

Omnium: God is the source of all that has ontological status apart from Himself, yet creaturely choices are up to the creature alone. And with respect to the much discussed dilemma of how to reconcile libertarian freedom with divine foreknowledge, Rogers finds in Anselm the answer: God's knowledge of what free creatures will do is caused by their freely doing it, and God can know what they will freely do because the entirety of time exists and is present to Him. In short, Rogers makes a strong case that, alongside Molinism and Open Theism, the Anselmian Account deserves a serious hearing by contemporary theists with libertarian intuitions.

Anselm on Freedom does what you would expect from a good book on a historical figure. It shows the significance of Anselm in his historical context, and it attempts to achieve clarity on matters where Anselm might easily be misunderstood. An instance of the former: If Rogers's interpretation of Augustine and his legacy is correct, then throughout his career Augustine was a compatibilist, and no one of note until Anselm saw how to embrace libertarianism without lapsing into Pelagianism (Chapters Two and Seven). An instance of the latter: Rogers takes pains to show that Anselm's doctrine of the two affections, one for rightness of will and one for benefit, need not be interpreted as saying that a desire for rightness of will excludes the desire for benefit. On the contrary, every one of our choices is motivated by a desire for benefit, and the desire for rightness of will is properly understood as a second order desire regarding our desire for benefit, namely, that we desire only those benefits we ought to desire.⁴

Such hallmarks of good historical work noted, what distinguishes *Anselm on Freedom* from many books in the history of philosophy is Rogers's eagerness to bring Anselm into direct conversation with the ideas and arguments of contemporary philosophers. For the sake of this engagement, Rogers characterizes Anselm's views using terminology drawn from contemporary literature, and not employed by Anselm himself. So, Rogers's Anselm embraces "libertarianism" and rejects "compatibilism,"⁵ offers a "hierarchical account" of free will in a way that anticipates the work of Harry Frankfurt,⁶ anticipates also Robert Kane's notion of the will's "plural voluntary control,"⁷ and adopts a "four-dimensionalist" theory of time (Chapters Eight and Nine). Not only are these terms not employed by Anselm, neither does Anselm *explicitly* consider the exact propositions these terms are used by contemporary philosophers to signify.

Rogers is well aware that this approach to a historical figure might draw criticism.⁸ Indeed, it has drawn criticism. One reviewer, alongside critiques of a fairly routine sort regarding Rogers's interpretation of Anselm, compounds these critiques by offering a "diagnosis," explaining what leads Rogers to her (in his view) erroneous interpretations.⁹ It turns out that Rogers has succumbed to the temptation to approach the history of philosophy as if there were perennial questions—such as the relationship between freedom and determinism, or how to reconcile divine foreknowledge and free will—and as if there were a stock of possible answers to

⁴ Rogers, *AOF*, 66-72.

⁵ Rogers, *AOF*, 5.

⁶ Rogers, *AOF*, 60-62.

⁷ Rogers, *AOF*, 99-102.

⁸ Rogers, *AOF*, 1-2.

⁹ Thomas Williams, *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews* (www.ndpr.nd.edu/review), 2009.02.11.

these questions residing in logical space. So tempted, a historian will also be tempted to find in the writings of historical figures views of contemporary philosophers that the historical figures never contemplated, and answers to questions the historical figures never even asked: A recipe for bad exegesis.

I will leave the dispute over the proper interpretation of Anselm to those, like Rogers and this reviewer, who know Anselm better than I. The reviewer's "dos and don'ts" regarding the history of philosophy, however, have little to recommend them. It is of course true (one might say, obvious) that there is a risk of misinterpreting a historical figure by reading into his account positions that distort it. Yet, there *are* philosophical questions and positions residing in logical space. A historical figure may not have contemplated them all, just as in all likelihood we haven't. Still, it can be fruitful to take a question that interests us to a historical figure who hasn't explicitly raised that question for himself; for, what he does say might still answer, or help us in answering, the question. And it can likewise be fruitful to ask whether what a historical figure says amounts to, or qualifies as, an instance of a position, even if the figure has never contemplated the position explicitly, or by name. Indeed, it may be possible to understand the account given by a historical figure better than that figure understood the account himself, just as professors sometimes understand the ideas their students espouse better than those students understand them. Neither Augustine nor Anselm, as far as I know, considers explicitly the positions "libertarianism" and "compatibilism" as those positions are defined by contemporary philosophers. Nevertheless, they both affirm the existence of free choice. And free choice either is or isn't compatible with determinism (precisely defined). So, it may be possible, on the basis of what Augustine and Anselm say, to categorize their positions as "libertarian" or "compatibilist." It would not be possible, of course, if what they say leaves it unclear whether on their accounts free choice is compatible with determinism. But if what they say makes it clear enough, then by seeing that their accounts constitute forms of "libertarianism" or "compatibilism," we have advanced in our understanding of those accounts.¹⁰ Isn't that one of the chief goals of the historian?

Rogers's methodology in *Anselm on Freedom*, then, seems perfectly respectable. It is not the only approach one might take to a historical figure, but it is a legitimate and fruitful approach. Indeed, if one sees philosophers across the ages as conversation-partners involved in a common project, it is a highly engaging approach. Rogers uses contemporary ideas to help shed light on Anselm's views, while using Anselm's insights to address problems that still exercise contemporary thinkers. The result is not simply a work in historiography, but Anselmianism as a living tradition. The book deserves the attention not only of those interested in this tradition, but of all theists wondering how to reconcile theistic commitments with libertarian freedom.

Libertarian Freedom and God the *Creator Omnium*

¹⁰ Of course, what can be said regarding the positions "libertarianism" and "compatibilism" can also be said regarding others positions, four-dimensionalism with respect to space and time, hierarchicalism with respect to the will, etc.

Among Rogers's goals in *Anselm on Freedom* is to show that Anselm successfully reconciles libertarian creaturely freedom with the doctrine that God is *creator omnium*, the source and cause of all being apart from Himself. Compared to the doctrine of divine foreknowledge, the doctrine of God as *creator omnium* has received little attention from contemporary philosophers of religion.¹¹ Yet, it arguably has just as firm a footing in the classic theological tradition. Thus, Augustine teaches that God's "hidden power . . . causes all that exists in any way to have whatever degree of being it has; for without Him, it would not exist in this way or that, nor would it have any being at all."¹² Aquinas holds that "Everything other than God . . . must be referred to Him as the cause of its being."¹³ And Anselm maintains that "With the exception of the Supreme Essence itself, nothing exists that is not made by the Supreme Essence."¹⁴

From such statements it is not difficult to see what the doctrine of God as *creator omnium* implies about God's relationship to creaturely choices and actions. Given that these actions and choices exist and are distinct from God, it follows that they are among the things God creates, makes, causes. Classical proponents of the doctrine do not draw back from this implication. Thus, Aquinas says that "the very act of [human] free will is traced to God as to a cause."¹⁵ And some of Anselm's most explicit acknowledgments of this implication come when he affirms that even sinful creaturely actions, insofar as they exist, have God as cause:

When the devil turned his will to what he should not, both his will and his turning were something real. . . . Insofar as the will and its movement or turning are real they are good and come from God.¹⁶

Every quality, every action, everything that has existence owes its being at all to God. . . . Therefore, although God is a factor in all that is done by a righteous or unrighteous will in its good and evil acts, nevertheless, in the case of its good acts he effects both their existence and their goodness, whereas in the case of its evil acts he causes them to be, not to be evil.¹⁷

¹¹ One way to confirm this point is by perusing the tables of contents of standard textbooks and anthologies in the philosophy of religion. Such books almost always include some treatment of problems associated with divine foreknowledge, but rarely devote time to problems that arise from the doctrine that God is *creator omnium*.

¹² Augustine, *The City of God Against the Pagans*, trans. and ed. R.W. Dyson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 12.26.

¹³ Aquinas, *Summa contra gentiles*, Bk. II, Ch. 15 (6), trans. James F. Anderson (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1975).

¹⁴ Anselm, *Monologion*, in *Anselm of Canterbury: The Major Works*, ed. Brian Davies and G.R. Evans (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 7:20.

¹⁵ Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I, Q. 22, A. 2 ad. 4. The translation is taken from the English Dominican Fathers.

¹⁶ Anselm, *De casu diaboli*, in *Anselm of Canterbury*, Davies, 20:222-23.

¹⁷ Anselm, *De concordia*, in *Anselm of Canterbury*, Davies, 1.7:447.

The very act of willing, which is sometimes righteous, sometimes unrighteous, and is nothing other than the employment of the will and power given by God, insofar as it exists, is something good and proceeds from God.¹⁸

In order to reconcile libertarian freedom with the doctrine of God as *creator omnium*, then, it looks like one needs to show that our choices and acts can be caused by God, yet still be free in the libertarian sense. Is this how Rogers sees the task? The answer, perhaps surprisingly, seems to be “no.” Rogers’s most frequent way of stating the doctrine is to say that God is “the cause of all that has *ontological status* apart from Himself.” One might presume that creaturely choices and actions have ontological status, from which it follows that they are caused by God. Yet, Rogers, it appears, wants to *deny*, both for herself and for Anselm, that God causes free creaturely choices. Unfortunately, to *deny* that God causes free creaturely choices would seem to commit Rogers to one of the following: Either to denying that creaturely choices have ontological status—a doubtful proposition; or to denying the doctrine of God as *creator omnium*, in which case Rogers doesn’t really reconcile that doctrine with libertarian freedom, after all.

In those passages where Rogers seems to deny that God causes free creaturely choices, the denial appears motivated by a combination of interpretive and philosophical concerns. First, central to her libertarian reading of Anselm is the idea that, for Anselm, free creatures have a measure of aseity in that they are able to be the primary or ultimate causes of their own choices and actions. She contrasts this view to a position she attributes to Augustine and Aquinas, according to which even though we, as secondary agents, cause our own choices, those choices are also immediately caused by God, the primary cause. The following passages suggest that, on Rogers’s reading of Anselm, only we, and not also God (or anything else), cause our free choices:

My use of the term ‘libertarian’ will intend only ‘unmodified’ or ‘immodest’ libertarianism, where the agent has open options and the choice is not ultimately caused by something outside himself. It is this second libertarian principle that takes precedence in Anselm’s thought. The human being is made in the image of God, and the real point of human freedom is that we should have a measure, however small and reflected, of true independence. Only then can we mirror the divine by being good on our own.¹⁹

I shall argue that in terms of the actual workings of free will, Anselm subscribes to a sort of libertarianism today labeled as the ‘self-causation’ view: for a choice to be free it must originate with the agent himself and not be fully traceable back to further causes outside the agent. In spite of Anselm’s adherence to the claim that all that has ontological status is immediately caused by God, there is a sense in which the agent can bear ‘ultimate responsibility’ for his choices.²⁰

¹⁸ Anselm, *De concordia*, in *Anselm of Canterbury*, Davies, 1.7:448.

¹⁹ Rogers, *AOF*, 6.

²⁰ Rogers, *AOF*, 60.

Augustine and Aquinas hold that all creatures are endowed by their Creator with real causal powers, but they, and all their properties, and all their acts, are also immediately caused by God. ... Anselm parts company with Augustine and Aquinas. He holds that, although all that has genuine ontological status is kept in being by God, it is up to the created agent to choose between options. If he should sin, he is himself the cause of the choice. And since he could sin, if he chooses to cling to the good given by God he does so on his own. Anselm does not use the term, but I take it that this aseity can be labeled a sort of 'primary' agency.²¹

One might wonder if I have misread the foregoing passages, but my reading is reinforced by a second set of passages where Rogers also appears to deny that God causes our free choices, this time for a different reason. Rogers holds, both for herself and for Anselm, that it is impossible for God to cause sin. Yet, she seems to think that were God to cause our choices—especially our sinful choices—he would be the cause of sin. So, she concludes that God does not cause our choices:

Anselm holds it to be logically impossible that God be the cause of sin. But creatures do sin. Therefore their choices are not manifestations of the divine will as primary agent.²²

If we do not want to say that God is the cause of sin, then we must hold that the choice for sin originates in the creature.²³

If created free agency is 'secondary' then, although it will be correct to say that the agent chooses by the power of his own will, the agent, the will, and everything about the choice are immediately caused by God. And in that case, God is 'the author of sin.'²⁴

If God is not the cause of sin, then the rational creature must be a primary agent. Choice must in some way originate in the creature.²⁵

It is logically impossible, in Anselm's system, that God should wholly cause the choices of a free creature, for good or ill.²⁶

What should we make of these two sets of passages from Rogers?

As a reading of Anselm, they seem problematic. The passages from Anselm quoted above make it clear that he thinks our choices and actions, even our sinful choices and actions, are real. As such, he maintains they are caused by God. Unless we want to say that Anselm's

²¹ Rogers, *AOF*, 11.

²² Rogers, *AOF*, 76.

²³ Rogers, *AOF*, 5.

²⁴ Rogers, *AOF*, 30.

²⁵ Rogers, *AOF*, 22.

²⁶ Rogers, *AOF*, 82.

views are inconsistent, we need to interpret his positions on creaturely freedom and on the impossibility of God's causing sin in a way that renders these positions consistent with his claim that God is the cause of all creaturely choices. So, for instance, Anselm's teaching that the free creature chooses from himself, or *sponte*, should not be interpreted as meaning that nothing besides the creature—not even God—causes the creature's choice. And his teaching that it is logically impossible for God to cause sin should not be interpreted to mean that it is logically impossible for God to cause the *act* of sin, or the sinful choice, insofar as it is real.

Rogers, I suspect, is led to deny that God causes free creaturely choices because she cannot see how a creaturely choice could be caused by God and still be free in the libertarian sense, or how God could cause a sinful choice without causing sin itself. I submit, however, that there is no necessary conflict here. Of course, if one defines libertarian freedom such that an agent's choice is free in the libertarian sense only if there is no cause of the choice other than the agent, then it will be impossible for a creaturely act caused by God to be free in the libertarian sense. But, if we define libertarianism in the standard way, as the view which affirms free will and sees free choices as being incompatible with determinism, then our free choices might be free in the libertarian sense and still caused by God, since God's causing our free choices might not entail that he determines them (as "determinism" is normally defined).²⁷ In a similar fashion, it may be that God can cause acts of sin or sinful choices without causing sin itself. For, as Anselm seems to believe, a sin of commission might involve not simply a choice, but a choice together with a deprivation of rightness or justice. To cause such a sin, then, one would have to cause both the choice and the deprivation. So, if God does not cause the deprivation, he would not cause the sin, even if he causes the choice that is deprived.

Exploring these possibilities further would take us beyond the scope of this paper.²⁸ I mention them only because I think it is quite possible for a philosopher, perhaps Anselm, consistently to endorse the following claims: that God causes all creaturely actions, that some creaturely actions are free in the libertarian sense, and that it is logically impossible for God to cause sin. The latter two claims should not be thought clearly to rule out the former.

I suggested above that Rogers's apparent denial that God causes free creaturely choices gives rise to a certain dilemma: either Rogers must deny that free creaturely choices have being (ontological status), or she must reject the doctrine of God as *creator omnium*, in which case she hasn't reconciled the doctrine with libertarian freedom, after all. Yet, Rogers seems intent on affirming the doctrine of God as *creator omnium*, and she offers what is unmistakably an attempt to reconcile that doctrine with libertarian creaturely freedom. Let us turn, then, to this attempt.

²⁷ Just as God's causing our free choices might not entail that he determines them, so also it might not entail that our actions lose the features of being ultimately up to us, or such that we could have done otherwise all antecedent conditions remaining the same.

²⁸ For those interested in further exploration, see my "Can a Libertarian hold that our Free Acts are Caused by God?" in *Faith and Philosophy*, Vol. 27, No. 1 (January 2010); my "Aquinas on how God Causes the Act of Sin Without Causing Sin Itself," in *The Thomist*, Vol. 73, No. 3 (July 2009); and my "Anselm, God, and the Act of Sin: Interpretive Difficulties," *The Saint Anselm Journal* Vol. 5, No. 2 (Spring 2008).

First, some preliminaries: Recall that Anselm distinguishes three senses of “will.”²⁹ The will as “instrument” is the faculty or power of willing. The will as “affection” is that in virtue of which the will as instrument is inclined or disposed to will something, or something of a particular sort. The will as “use” or “employment” occurs when, with the will as tool, we actually and consciously turn toward and will something to which we are disposed by will as affection. For Anselm, “choice” is a use or employment of the will, and every choice is for some object (or type of object) to which we are disposed by affection. It follows that if we had affection for only one object, then that is the only object we could choose. Choice among alternative possibilities requires that we have affections for multiple objects.³⁰ Anselm, of course, is primarily concerned with the affection for benefit and the affection for justice, since these affections make possible the morally significant alternatives of preserving justice or abandoning it for the sake of some illicit benefit. Nevertheless, we can see that on Anselm’s account even choice between morally insignificant alternatives will require that we have affections for both alternatives.

With these preliminaries behind us, we are now in a position to consider Rogers’s attempted reconciliation of libertarian freedom with the doctrine of God as *creator omnium*. According to Rogers, a creaturely free choice will always involve a competition, as it were, between two or more affections for alternative objects. The choice itself is simply a “winning out” of one of these affections. As such, a choice is not some “new thing” over and above the affections themselves. God, says Rogers, is the cause both of the will as instrument, and of the affections for the various possible objects of choice. Since the choice itself is simply a “winning out” of one of these divinely caused affections, and not some new thing in its own right, it follows that God is the cause of all that has ontological status in the choice. On the other hand, which of the affections wins out, Rogers insists, is up to the creature, not God. Thus, the choice is free in the libertarian sense, and yet all that has ontological status in the choice is caused by God, in keeping with the doctrine of God as *creator omnium*. Here is Rogers:

If all that has ontological status is made and sustained by God, how can there be any room for created aseity? Anselm responds that it is indeed the case that all that exists comes from God, including all the elements of a free choice. The agent, the agent’s desires and motivations, even the choice as a sort of act, are kept in being by God. What is entirely up to the agent, struggling with a moral choice, is which of his desires will actually ‘win out’. But this ‘winning out’ is not some new *thing*. It is simply the final success of one God-given desire over another.³¹

In order to allow created freedom, God bestows upon the created agent the two *affectiones*. Thus morally significant choice consists in a struggle within the agent, due to the conflict between the desire for the inappropriate benefit, and the desire for justice which would lead him to endorse only the appropriate desires.

²⁹ See *De Concordia*, 3.11.

³⁰ For Rogers’s discussion of these points, see *AOF*, 74-78.

³¹ Rogers, *AOF*, 12.

Preceding the final decision there are, as it were, two streams of desire competing for ascendancy. Or, to put it another way, the agent is trying to pursue two desires, where ultimate success regarding one entails the abandonment of the other. Sin occurs when the agent ‘succeeds’ in following the desire for the inappropriate benefit. One of the two God-given desires becomes the actual choice. The agent, the will as instrument, the motivating desires, and hence the desire which ‘wins out’ are all from God. There is no *thing* in this story which is not from God.³²

God is the cause of the existence of all the elements in the choice, but which option ‘wins out’ in a morally significant choice is up to the created agent.³³

Let me conclude by raising a series of questions and concerns about Rogers’s attempted reconciliation. This will afford Rogers the opportunity to clarify her position and respond to my criticisms.

First, leaving God out of the picture for a moment, choice would seem to be more than simply the “winning out” of one among competing desires within the agent. Even were we to concede that choosing between alternative possibilities presupposes that we have desires for the alternatives, the choice between the desires surely involves the agent’s making a decision or judgment of some sort. Otherwise, the agent is too passive, the winning out of one desire over another being something that happens within him or to him, but not something he *does* or something over which he has control. Indeed, if choice is nothing more than the winning out of one desire over others, it cannot be that which determines which desire wins out. But, then, contrary to Rogers’s intent, it is hard to see how it is really *up to* the agent which desire wins out. I grant that when a choice for A over B is made, we can say that the agent’s desire for A “won out” over his desire for B. But it seems a mistake to say that the choice for A is nothing but the winning out of a desire.

Second, given that Rogers does want to characterize choice as simply the winning out of one desire over others, and given her insistence that this winning out is not a new thing, should we interpret Rogers as embracing the first horn of the dilemma that I say results from her denying that God causes free creaturely actions? That is, when Rogers denies that the winning out is a new thing, is she in effect saying that creaturely choices don’t have ontological status? And, if so, does she take this to be Anselm’s view?

Third, and most significantly, suppose we take seriously the idea that a creaturely choice, a winning out, is no new thing, nothing over and above the desires and other elements placed in the creature by God. In that case, despite Rogers’s intentions, it looks like God will cause creaturely choices, after all. Here’s an analogy. Suppose Kate Rogers and I race each other in the 100 yard dash. And suppose Kate’s winning the race is nothing over and above her crossing the

³² Rogers, *AOF*, 118.

³³ Rogers, *AOF*, 175.

finish line before I do. Now suppose God is the cause of Kate, of me, of the track, and of both our sprints down the track. Given that Kate's winning is nothing over and above her crossing the finish line before I, and given that God is the cause of Kate's running across the finish line, and the cause of my running a dozen yards behind, it seems clear that God is the cause of Kate's winning. If Kate's winning is ontologically reducible to what God causes, then Kate's winning is caused by God. By the same token, if a creaturely choice, a winning out, adds nothing new to what God has placed in the creature, if it is ontologically reducible to elements caused by God, then the choice itself is caused by God.

Now, as should be clear, I am not bothered by the proposition that God causes creaturely choices. As best I can tell, Anselm accepts the proposition, and I think the proposition compatible with libertarian creaturely freedom. Yet, Rogers's strategy for reconciling libertarian freedom with God as *creator omnium* depends on the claim that free creaturely choices, "winnings out," are up to the creature alone, and not caused by God. Thus, the conclusion of the argument in the foregoing paragraph poses a significant problem for Rogers's strategy. Rogers could avoid the conclusion by finding some way to say that the creature's choice is not ontologically reducible to elements caused by God. But this move would involve acknowledging that the choice is something with a genuine ontological status of its own. And now we are back to the second horn of the dilemma. For, to say that the choice has ontological status, but is not caused by God, amounts to a simple rejection of the doctrine of God as *creator omnium*.

So here, in sum, is Rogers's dilemma as I see it. Her strategy for reconciling libertarian freedom with God as *creator omnium* depends on denying that God causes free creaturely choices. This denial means that she must either deny that creaturely choices have ontological status, or reject the doctrine of God as *creator omnium*. In an effort to preserve the doctrine of God as *creator omnium*, she gives an account of creaturely choice on which such choices end up being ontologically reducible to what God causes. But that entails that the choices themselves are caused by God, thwarting her strategy for preserving libertarian freedom. The only way to avoid having the choices caused by God is to give them an ontological status of their own—to say that they are something over and above the elements caused by God. But giving them an ontological status of their own while denying that they are caused by God amounts to a simple rejection of the doctrine of God as *creator omnium*. So, either Rogers has to concede that creaturely choices are caused by God, in which case she preserves the doctrine of God as *creator omnium*, but has no strategy for showing how that doctrine is consistent with libertarian creaturely freedom; or, she persists in denying that creaturely choices are caused by God, in which case, instead of reconciling libertarian creaturely freedom with the doctrine of God as *creator omnium*, she simply abandons the doctrine.